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Introduction:
Mass immigration into Ireland is a new phenomenon. As recently as 1991, residents of Ireland who were born elsewhere numbered 228,725, or six per cent of the total population, but only 40,341 of those had been born outside the UK or the US. Two decades later the foreign-born numbered 766,770, or 17 per cent of the total, and three-fifths of those (or 10.6 per cent of the total) were from outside the UK. The big rise in the numbers of residents of east European origin-and especially the influx from Poland-are often highlighted, but between 2002 and 2011 the number of African-born residents doubled (from 26,515 to 54,419) and that of Asian-born residents almost trebled (from 28,132 to 79,021).
Not only was the immigration unprecedented for Ireland; it was also very big-in relative, not in absolute terms-by present-day European standards (Figure 1 ). The economic context for the influx was the Celtic Tiger-rapid economic growth fuelled at first by sound and innovative policies, but in its later stages by property and credit bubbles.
Unwarranted growth was followed, inevitably, by economic collapse in 2008. 3 [ Figure 1 about here]
At first sight the impact of immigration on Irish attitudes is curious 3 Two useful analyses of the economic background are Kinsella and Leddin (2011) and Donovan and Murphy (2013). and ambivalent. On the one hand, so far at least, Ireland has been spared the xenophobic brand of politics currently in the ascendant across much of Europe. On the other hand, successive opinion polls also point to significant anti-immigrant feeling. A September 2008 poll 4 found that two-thirds of respondents were in favour of more restrictive immigration laws, whereas only seven per cent favoured less restrictive laws. 5 Another poll just over a year later 6 reported a big majority (72 per cent) wanting to see a reduction in the number of immigrants. Over two-fifths declared that they would like to see some, but not all, immigrants leave, while 29 per cent would like to see most leave, and just over one in four was happy to leave the number as it was.
Further insight into attitudes to immigration may be gained from between the first three variables show that hostility to immigrants was strongly correlated with hostility to travellers, implying that apart from any economic threat they presented, immigrants were perceived by some as undesirables as 'others' or 'different'. Age was not a good predictor of attitudes, but the level of education was. More educated people tended to be more tolerant of difference but perhaps this was because they did not live cheek by jowl with either travellers or immigrants.
[ Table 1 In this paper, we invoke the European Social Survey (ESS), which has already been widely used for insights into popular attitudes to immigration (e.g. Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2005, 2012; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009) The ESS contains six questions about immigrants, three about how many immigrants should be allowed in (depending on race, country of origin etc.) and three more general questions about whether the respondents thought immigration were good for the country in different domains 10 . Using principal component analysis, we use these six questions to generate ATTIM, a synthetic measure of whether people 9 For more on the ESS see: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. Compare Mayda 2006 Mayda , 2010 Facchini and Mayda 2009; Callens, Valentova, and Meuleman 2012; Malchow-Møller et al. 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007; Gomellini and Ó Gráda 2012. 10 The appendix has details of the six questions.
Data and methods
were for or against immigrants and immigration generally 11 . This ignores variation between questions, of course, but the idea is that there is some underlying latent variable driving the answers to these questions. Normalized to μ = 0 and σ 2 = 1 over the three waves, ATTIM can be used to analyze the trend in Irish attitudes to immigrants and what sort of people are more or less sympathetic to immigrants. We also generate a second variable, Z (for xenophobia), which is an attempt to capture particular hostility reserved for immigrants who differ ethnically/racially from the host population. Respondents were about asked their attitude to immigrants from the same race/ethnic country as the majority in the country. They were asked the same question about immigration from different race/ethnic groups than the majority. The possible responses to both questions were "Allow many to come and live here", "Allow some", "Allow a few" and "Allow none". We code Z=1 if respondents want to allow fewer from the non-majority race/ethnic group than from the majority and Z=0 otherwise. In the Irish context, which is our sole focus here, Z may be interpreted as a measure of a respondent's preference for returning Irish immigrants and for immigrants from the United Kingdom and the United States over immigrants from elsewhere. In the case of other economies, where return migration is unimportant, it might indicate instead a preference for Caucasian over black or Muslim immigrants-or, in the case of Israel, for Jewish over all other immigrants.
In addition to OLS models of the predictors of these attitudinal variables for three of the waves we calculate Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions between the first pair (2002 & 2006) and the second pair (2006 & 2012) 12 . This decomposes the changes in the mean into the sum of three components. The first is that due to the changes in the explanatory variables. In models of earnings gaps this is referred to as the "endowment effect". The second component is due to changes in the parameters. In models of earnings gaps this is sometimes interpreted as discrimination although other interpretations are possible. The final component is simply an interaction between the first two. In this application the regression coefficients measure how a particular covariate translates into a particular attitude so changes in the coefficients correspond to changes in "tastes". The decomposition is invariant to the normalization of the dependent variable although the regression coefficients are not.
Results
Before considering an econometric analysis of the data it is useful to view the broad trends in the data. 
Explaining the levels of anti-immigrant feeling
This poses the question: why have attitudes in Ireland changed? Table 2 finding it difficult to cope given their household income (the four categories are, in order, "living comfortably", "coping", "difficult" and "very difficult"). Freehms specifically asks whether "Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish" with five possible answers "Agree strongly", "Agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Disagree" and "Disagree strongly". Freehms is included as a measure of a broader noneconomic hostility against 'others' so high values correspond to greater aversion to "others". While these three variables are subject to the critique that they are not entirely 'objective' (Bertrand and period than at the beginning. This change could be due to changing macroeconomic circumstances but it may also reflect a higher presence of immigrants at the end of the period. 15 Those who held liberal views on gay and lesbian rights were more pro-immigrant throughout. This correlation is not interpreted causally. Nonetheless it is very useful to know that people's attitudes lie along, to some extent, on broadly liberal/conservative lines.
To see whether our results partly reflect the presence of immigrants in the population, Table 2b repeats the estimation but with immigrants excluded. For the most part, this seems to make little difference -partly because of the small numbers involved. Curiously the negative effect of being female on attitudes to immigrants becomes smaller and less well determined when immigrants are omitted in 2012.
[ Tables 2a and 2b about here]
Explaining the level of xenophobia:
Figure 2b describes the trend in Z, our measure of xenophobia, between 2002 and 2012. Recall that this is a binary variable equal to 1 if respondents are more averse to immigration from the non-majority ethnic/racial group than from the majority (i.e. Irish). It is rather striking how Z fell quickly at first, and then more slowly with the recession. Table   3a reports the results of regressing Z against the same variables as in the 15 Compare Ó Gráda (2013). previous section for the same three periods 16 . Note that as this is a linear probability model the coefficients represent the change in the probability of the outcome occurring (in this case, being xenophobic) associated with a unit change in the covariate. So, for example, the coefficient on Female, -0.0317, in column 1 means that women are about 3 percentage points less likely to be xenophobic.
None of our variables packs much punch in either 2002 or 2006, but in 2012/3 the negative coefficient on STFECO suggests that the greater dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, the higher is xenophobia. Less easy to understand is the finding that the greater the difficulty people have in making ends meet, the higher is Z. The effect of education is small and not statistically significant in all three periods.
While Table 2 indicates that education is associated with more positive attitudes to immigrants, Table 3 suggests that this effect does not discriminate between the ethnic origins of the immigrants. We also find that in times of recession, those who tend to be hostile to lesbian and gay rights also tend to be more hostile to immigrants of a different ethnicity. That is the correlation between people's different sentiments towards "difference" is stronger in the recession. If one thinks of these different attitudes as reflecting a latent attitude towards others, it appears that this latent variable becomes more patent as perhaps the recession concentrates people's minds. Overall though, we have found 16 Since the dependent variable is binary one could use an estimator such as logit or probit. To facilitate interpretation we use a linear probability model but with robust standard errors. it difficult to find characteristics in the data that predict people's xenophobia (as defined here).
[ Tables 3a and 3b about here]
Decomposing changes in attitudes
Irish attitudes to immigration hardened with the economic downturn, but not in a straightforward way. To what extent is that hardening explained by changes in economic wellbeing? We end with Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the change in the levels of our two outcomes between each of the consecutive pairs of ESS waves (2002 & 2006, and 2006 & 2012) 17 . Looking at the first column in Table 3a Turning to changes associated with changing tastes, (which arises from the differences in coefficients across columns in Table 3a) Table 5 carries out the same decomposition with regard to the models of xenophobia, Z, reported in Table 3a . Here the challenge is to explain a large and then a small reduction in xenophobia. Since Table   3a did not reveal very much, it is perhaps not surprising that the decomposition does not help much either. However, it is noticeable that changing endowments, the characteristics of people, explain none of the decline in xenophobia between 2002 and 2006. Instead it is the taste effect: how people respond to these characteristics. Even there however the only individually significant in coefficients is on age, which goes the "wrong way": it predicts higher xenophobia. The overall coefficient effect (=0.0964) is from a combination of changing economic circumstances and levels of satisfaction with the economy.
As pointed out earlier, these effects are not well determined so we do not read too much into them. Paradoxically the smaller fall in xenophobia between 2006 and 2012 is somewhat easier to explain.
None of the three components is big and even then they cancel each other out to some extent. But within the endowment effect there are opposing forces: falling levels of satisfaction with the economy is increasing xenophobia (=-0.0376), but this is partly cancelled out by individuals' greater financial difficulties. As already noted above, the two economic variables somewhat surprisingly work in opposite directions when it comes to xenophobia.
[ Table 4 about here]
Conclusions
Over the past decade or so, Ireland has been transformed from a place where immigrants were few to one where one resident in six is born outside the country. The impact of this change on public opinion is of considerable interest. In this paper we have sought to identify that impact and the factors that influence it. Not surprisingly, the economic downturn after 2007 had a negative impact on attitudes to immigration.
At the same time there is evidence that the Irish have become more accepting of people from very different backgrounds. How the trends in Irish opinion have diverged from those of other European countries is an interesting question, which we will address in future work.
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